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1. Introduction 
Recent evidence documents that half the adult world population is unbanked (Chaia et 
al., 2013) and so it is important to understand the factors that explain financial 
exclusion, how it can be fought and the benefits that can be gained from overcoming it. 
A major cause of financial exclusion is the simple fact that the demand for standard 
financial services is low among low-income individuals. A sizable empirical literature 
shows that it is, to some extent, possible to reduce financial exclusion in these low-
demand regimes by lowering the user costs of financial services through financial 
innovations such as microcredit (Banerjee et al., 2015; Kaboski and Townsend, 2011), 
subsidised state-led programs (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Burgess et al., 2005) or 
sophisticated information collection (Bruhn and Love, 2014). However, there are 
natural limits to this line of action with take-up being moderate (Banerjee et al., 2015; 
Dupas et al., 2016) and subsidized state-led programs costly (Burgess and Pande, 2005).  
 
Ultimately, full financial inclusion only seems possible when it is accompanied by the 
growth needed to generate demand for traditional banking products. But here a new 
concern emerges. As a country moves up the income distribution, there may well be 
structural impediments to supply rising to meet demand. These impediments are 
potentially extremely costly as they deny standard banking products to prototypical 
customers. In this paper, we focus on this second form of financial exclusion, which has 
been considerably less studied in the empirical literature. In particular, we are interested 
in the benefits of letting supply flexibly adjust to meet the unbanked in contexts of 
burgeoning demand typical of emerging markets in full transition from developing to 
developed status. A paper providing evidence for a related setting is Fulford (2015).1 
 
We document a historical instance in the development of the Spanish banking system, 
namely, the banking status quo imposed by the Fascist regime in the aftermath of the 
Spanish Civil War in 1939, which froze financial growth for more than twenty years. 
The main consequence of this banking status quo was the growing mismatch between 
the demand for and the supply of financial services as the country transitioned from 
                                                          
1
 Fulford (2015) focuses on the expansion of US national banks in the late XIX century, which was 
restricted by large minimum size requirements, into unbanked counties. Related papers study the effects 
of relatively sophisticated forms of lending in already banked and developed countries: Guiso et al. 
(2004), Pascali (2016), Black and Strahan (2002), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), Kerr and Nanda (2009) 
and Samila and Sorenson (2011). 
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developing to developed status.2 This mismatch was particularly problematic in those 
municipalities that had remained unbanked. Between 1964 and 1974, the Government 
launched an ambitious program, the Banking Expansion Plan, aimed essentially at 
banking unbanked municipalities.3 It was to be implemented via nine annual plans in 
the case of the commercial banks and a further seven in the case of the savings banks, 
which identified eligible locations for branch openings.4 As a result of the program, the 
number of bank branches doubled as did the percentage of banked municipalities with 
more than 1,000 inhabitants. As such, the Banking Expansion Plan offers a great 
opportunity to study the benefits of banking the unbanked when the latter have a 
naturally high demand for traditional financial services but, due to impediments, the 
supply has failed to reach them. By studying the benefits of the Banking Expansion 
Plan, we can also infer the costs of the status quo.  
 
To capture the benefits of the Banking Expansion Plan, we focus on two main 
questions. First, we set out to isolate the overall effect of the plans on local economic 
activity. The structure of lending and savings services was relatively simple during the 
unfolding of the plans. Credit basically provided liquidity and working capital via short-
term loans and the discounting of trade bills with maturities of up to 90 days. Savings 
products consisted of traditional savings and term deposits, linked savings deposits and 
checking accounts. We seek to determine if such lending and savings products had any 
impact on local economic activity.  
 
Second, we wish to shed light on the mechanisms – lending vs. savings channels – 
driving this effect. Improved access to credit, for example, may have increased 
economic activity by lifting investment and consumption constraints.5 On the other 
                                                          
2
 GDP doubled between 1930 (before the outbreak of the Civil War) and 1964 (the end of the status quo), 
but the number of bank branches and banked municipalities remained the same. 
3
 Unlike most state-led programs in developing countries, the main goal of the Banking Expansion Plan 
was not to reach the poor. It involved neither a significant element of subsidy nor the refinancing of loss 
making branches. On the contrary, the banks themselves had to pay to expand into the municipalities 
listed in the plans. 
4
 Commercial banks are purely profit-driven public limited companies. Savings banks are private limited 
companies with a board of directors comprising representatives from local public bodies (i.e., the 
municipalities and autonomous communities). Due to their ownership structure, savings banks often have 
to meet specific targets set by public authorities. 
5
 Microcredit was found to expand the scale of existing self-employment activities of households in rural 
areas of Morocco (Crépon et al., 2015) and small business investment and profits of pre-existing 
businesses in Hyderabad, India, (Banerjee et al., 2015), but it had no effect on business expansion in the 
Philippines (Karlan and Zinman, 2010). 
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hand, improved savings services may have allowed individuals to save up for lumpy 
investments or to set aside some money to consume out of their permanent rather than 
their temporary income, perhaps boosting local demand or shifting their occupational 
choices towards riskier jobs, such as entrepreneurship. Disentangling the two channels 
is complicated because banks typically supply both lending and savings services 
concurrently. Fortunately, at that time, savings banks primarily provided savings 
services at the municipality level, but were unable to use these savings to lend locally. 
This enables us to tease out the importance of the lending and savings channels by 
comparing the respective effects of the commercial and savings banks’ plans. To date, 
the only papers to have isolated the effects of savings services are Dupas and Robinson 
(2013a; 2013b) and Dupas et al. (2016).6  
 
To analyse the effects of the plans we have created a new data set from the detailed lists 
of municipalities included in each of the annual plans, consulted in the historical 
archives of the Bank of Spain and the Ministry of Finance, the two authorities with 
responsibility for the Banking Expansion Plan. This information was matched to 
outcome variables (number of workers and business establishments per inhabitant) from 
the 1970 Census of Establishments and to a rich set of municipality-level characteristics 
drawn from several sources.7 The resulting data set provides a cross-section of nearly 
3,000 unbanked municipalities, some of which were incorporated into the plans and 
some of which were not.8  
 
                                                          
6
 Dupas and Robinson (2013a) found that alleviating savings constraints through subsidized savings 
accounts favours microenterprise development among women market vendors (but not men bicycle taxi 
drivers) in Bumala Town in Kenya, a town with little access to both credit and savings services prior to 
the experiment. Dupas and Robinson (2013b) documented that providing individuals with simple 
informal savings technologies can substantially increase investment in preventative health. Dupas et al. 
(2016) found no discernible effects on savings activity of expanding basic savings accounts in Uganda, 
Malawi and Chile. 
7
 The Census of Establishments was compiled for the first time in 1970, which means no censuses are 
available for previous years. Since then it has been published every ten years. It reports the number of 
establishments and employees by sector of activity for all Spanish municipalities. 
8
 These are virtually all the municipalities larger than 1,000 inhabitants without commercial bank 
branches (but, perhaps, with savings bank branches) by the beginning of the plans. Most of the control 
variables are available only for municipalities larger than 1,000 inhabitants, so we restrict the analysis to 
these municipalities (smaller municipalities had a marginal presence in the plans). We initially retain 
municipalities with savings bank branches, which had little access to credit due to the savings banks 
inability to lend locally. However, in further instances of the paper we work with a subsample of totally 
unbanked municipalities (i.e. municipalities that had neither commercial nor savings bank branches by the 
beginning of the plans). 
4
Our identification strategy exploits the quasi-experimental design of the program. The 
number of unbanked municipalities was substantial at the outset.9 The authorities could 
have opted to bank them all at once, but they believed the banks were not ready for such 
a mammoth undertaking, and so they designed a staggered expansion that would 
involve no more than a few hundred municipalities each year. Objective and observable 
rules of preference were established to decide which municipalities should be given 
priority, with municipality size being by far the most important of these. Conditional on 
these rules (which are well captured by our set of control variables), inclusion in the 
plans was as good as random. However, this was most certainly not the case with final 
branch decisions, as the plans were treated pretty much like a menu, with the banks 
cherry picking the most desirable municipalities on the plans and even going so far as to 
lobby for municipalities not included. For this reason, we focus on intent-to-treat (ITT) 
estimates based on inclusion in the plans. 
 
We report two main findings. First, inclusion in the pre-1970 plans was responsible for 
a 9% increase in the number of workers per inhabitant in 1970, but had no effect on the 
number of establishments per inhabitant.10 This is a fairly large effect considering that 
we provide ITT estimates with possible spillovers from treated to control municipalities. 
In a finer breakdown by sector, we find significant extensive margin effects at around 
5% for the retail and services sectors. No effects are found for the manufacturing sector, 
which can geographically dissociate production and sales and which could have 
adjusted ex ante to the local shortage of banking services.  
 
Second, the effects on the intensive and extensive margins are driven entirely by the 
commercial banks’ plans, which indicates the plans increased economic activity 
essentially via the lending channel. Whether lending was extended for investment or 
consumption purposes we cannot tell. Given the structure of lending, we would expect 
investment loans to have played a more prominent role. However, that some of the 
documented effect might have been caused by an increase in local demand triggered by 
                                                          
9
 More than 2,000 municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants were unbanked by the beginning of the 
plans. So were the more than 4,000 municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. 
10
 The baseline estimates are on a sample of municipalities without commercial bank branches. In 
subsequent robustness checks we show that the results hold for a subsample of totally unbanked 
municipalities (i.e. municipalities that had neither commercial nor savings bank branches by the 
beginning of the plans). The control variables that capture the rules of preference used to elaborate the 
plans are only available for municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants.  
5
consumption loans cannot be ruled out. Our finding that the savings banks’ plans had no 
effect on economic activity does not necessarily mean that the savings channel does not 
matter. It might just take longer than the time span covered in our setting for the savings 
channel to generate significant effects, as individuals must first save a reasonable 
amount of money in order to finance lumpy purchases to establish or expand a 
business.11 
 
The estimated effects are resistant to a series of placebo and robustness tests. First, 
conditional on the control variables, the post-1970 plans are uncorrelated with the 
outcome variables. This suggests that the estimated effect is really driven by increased 
lending opportunities and not artificially generated by an omitted variables bias. The 
same does not hold for actual branch openings with both pre- and post-1970 branch 
openings being correlated with 1970 outcomes. Second, the estimated effect is still 
present for what is, presumably, a stricter subsample of control municipalities that had 
received commercial bank branch openings by 1980 (after branching restrictions were 
lifted in 1974) and which were, therefore, perceived as desirable locations that had 
simply not been included in the plans. Third, the estimated effect is slightly stronger for 
a subsample of municipalities that had neither commercial nor savings banks’ branches 
at the beginning of the program and which were likely to be more severely affected by 
the lack of banking services. 
 
All told, our results stress that allowing the supply of financial services to adjust 
flexibly to demand is important in contexts of growing demand typical of emerging 
markets in full transition from developing to developed status. In our specific context, 
the restrictions imposed by the status quo forced unbanked municipalities to operate 
substantially below their potential for a long period of time. The provision of banking 
services to unbanked municipalities quickly translated into a substantial increase in 
economic activity, these gains being essentially triggered by the lending channel 
through the provision of liquidity and working capital. 
 
                                                          
11
 Given the nature of our data, we can only capture effects that translate into an increased number of 
workers or establishments. This limits our capacity to study interesting mechanisms that can be better 
explored with household surveys. For instance, Banerjee et al.’s (2015) main finding is that microfinance 
helps households make different intertemporal choices in consumption allowing them to sacrifice 
instantaneous utility for durable goods. Fulford (2013) argues that easier access to credit may reduce 
precautionary savings and welfare in the long run. 
6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical 
context and the Spanish Banking Expansion Plan; Section 3 describes the data used in 
the regressions; Section 4 describes our research design; Section 5 presents the results, 
and Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Historical context, program description and data 
2.1. Historical context 
Spain’s modern banking system came into being around 1850, coinciding with the 
country’s industrial revolution, and by 1930 had achieved a notable size. However, its 
natural evolution was dramatically interrupted in 1936 with the outbreak of the Civil 
War. The division of the country into Nationalist and Republican factions brought 
Spain’s monetary and banking system to the point of collapse. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war, one of the first tasks addressed by the newly born Fascist regime 
was the reconstruction of the country’s financial system. This process was underpinned 
by a series of restrictive norms that ensured that the banking system was heavily 
regulated until virtually the end of the dictatorship. This regulatory wave ushered in a 
period of what became known as the banking status quo of 1939 to 1964, decades 
characterised by the restrictions imposed by the Ministry of Finance, limiting banking 
activity to those that had been registered as bankers prior to the Civil War. As such, new 
entrants could not overcome the barriers to the banking market, while incumbent banks 
were only permitted to open new branches under the strict supervision of the Ministry 
of Finance. The result was that the number of bank branches barely increased during the 
period of status quo.  
 
This stagnant financial system was aligned to Spain’s economic self-sufficiency of the 
40s. However, as the economy progressively moved away from autarky to a tentative 
opening up of its markets in the fifties, the economy began to demand greater financial 
resources. It was during these years that the inoperability of the banking system became 
more than apparent. In 1959 the government launched its National Plan of Economic 
Stabilization, which was to open up the country to trade and foreign direct investment, 
ushering in a decade of unprecedented economic growth. However, the banking system 
acted as a bottleneck, seriously limiting economic development. The response was the 
1962 Banking Law which broke the status quo and established the foundations for an 
7
ambitious Banking Expansion Plan aimed at promoting the provision of banking 
services throughout Spain.12  
 
The proposals for expanding the branch network were unfolded in nine plans for 
commercial banks and seven more for savings banks introduced between 1964 and 
1974.13 In August 1974 branching restrictions were totally lifted for commercial banks, 
which were allowed to branch nationwide, and only partly for savings banks, which 
were allowed to branch within their original provinces. Figure 1 shows the evolution in 
the percentage of banked municipalities and the total number of branches over the 
period 1950-1980. Both magnitudes remained steady during the status quo period and 
doubled during the Banking Expansion Plan. The number of commercial bank branches 
took off after the 1974 liberalization. We focus on the impact of the plans on the 
economic activity of municipalities that had no commercial banks prior to the Banking 
Expansion Plan period. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
2.2. Commercial banks vs. savings banks: lending and savings channels 
During the Banking Expansion Plans commercial banks served the dual purpose of 
promoting savings and offering credit. Regarding the latter, they essentially provided 
short-term credit through discounting of trade bills with maturities of up to 90 days. 
This also included financial bills of exchange, which were often not based on an 
underlying commercial transaction, but issued in order to obtain credit in the form of an 
advance with which to refinance operations, or alternatively were used to obtain a larger 
amount of funds than involved in the underlying commercial transaction. Commercial 
banks also provided credit and loans to businesses. Such credits were also generally 
short-term with maturities up to 90 days. However, they were frequently renewed, such 
that in practice business credit was extended over longer periods and could even exceed 
12 months. The structure of lending described so far implies that commercial banks 
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 For an excellent review of Spain’s banking history see Aceña (2005). 
13
 A detailed description of the Banking Expansion Plans for commercial banks can be consulted in Cruz-
Roche (1974). 
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provided mostly working capital and liquidity. Lending suitable for funding the creation 
of new businesses was scarcer.14  
 
The savings banks essentially fulfilled a savings function, with their lending role being 
severely restricted at the municipality level. This was the case because the savings 
banks were manipulated by the government as a means of financing its policy 
implemented through the so-called Development Plans. The Development Plans were 
launched by the government concurrently with the Banking Expansion Plan to rectify 
the marked economic and social disparities between Spanish regions through the 
promotion of growth in less developed areas.15 Mandatory investment requirements of 
80% of their deposits were imposed on savings banks to finance the public sector and 
companies, both public and private, on preferential terms at below-market interest rates. 
Such mandatory investment coefficients left savings banks with little leeway to provide 
loans to their traditional customers.16 
 
2.3. The Banking Expansion Plans 
The process that resulted in the drawing up of the plans was similar for commercial and 
savings banks. Figure 2 summarizes this process which is explained in more detail 
below. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
2.3.1. Commercial bank plans 
The commercial bank plans were drawn up for each financial year by the Bank of Spain, 
which determined the number of new branches to be included in the plan, their 
respective locations and the banking institution that would be responsible for each 
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 More information on the main features of the commercial banks during the described period can be 
found in Martín-Aceña (2012). 
15
 See Pujadas and Font (1998) for a detailed explanation of Spanish regional policy during this period. 
Unlike the Banking Expansion Plans, which were targeted at a large number of small municipalities, the 
Development Plans focused on a few relatively large cities most of which are not included in our study as 
they were already banked at the outset of the plans. The First Development Plan (1964-1967) essentially 
channelled public aid to a small list of cities in the hope they might become “Industrial Development 
Poles”. The Second Development Plan (1969-1972) simply extended the list of cities that would benefit 
from public aid. The Third Development Plan (1972-1975) modified the strategy and worked with the 
notion of “Great Areas of Industrial Expansion” that extended over larger regions rather than just cities. 
16
 More information on the main features of the savings banks during this period can be found in Comín 
(2012) 
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opening. The Bank of Spain first drafted a preliminary plan identifying the number of 
branches to be opened in each municipality in a given year. A municipality could be 
included in the plan if it met one of the following conditions: a) it had a total absence of 
banking services; b) it had an insufficient banking service given its wealth, population 
and economic activity; c) it had an insufficient banking service given the economic 
development programs for the municipality and its surroundings; d) it would benefit 
from more intense banking competition.  
 
The Bank of Spain’s main concern was the absence of banking services that afflicted 
many municipalities. Accordingly, most of the municipalities listed on the plans 
responded to criteria “a” and “b”.17 However, while in general no more than 300 
municipalities were included in each yearly plan, the number of municipalities subject 
to criteria  “a, b, c and d” was considerably larger than that.18 The Bank of Spain relied 
on certain objective information sources to decide which municipalities to include first 
in its plans. These sources, listed in the preface of the First Expansion Plan, were the 
1950 and 1960 population censuses, the geographic distribution of bank branches on the 
introduction of the plans in 1963, the economic outlook of each province, the location 
of the industrial promotion and development poles included in the Development Plans, 
the intensity of tourism and the capacity of the banks to expand. The preliminary plan 
was shared with the banks which could then suggest the addition or removal of certain 
municipalities. This feedback was factored in the final plan by the Bank of Spain. 
However, a comparison of the preliminary and final plans indicates that the banks’ 
suggestions did not result in major modifications.  
 
Upon approval by the Ministry of Finance, the final plan was circulated to all banks. 
The branches listed in the plan were tagged with prices that increased with the number 
of inhabitants in the municipality. Banks were given one month to choose which 
branches to bid for. The sum of prices paid for branches by a given bank could not 
exceed its expansion capacity, which was calculated as the sum of debt plus equity. It 
was in the banks’ interests to use their expansion capacity as productively as possible. If 
the branches offered in the plan were sited in unappealing locations, banks would lobby 
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 45% of branch openings responded to criterion “a” and 74% to criteria “a” or “b”.  
18
 Roughly 55% of the municipalities larger than 1,000 inhabitants were unbanked (about 4,000 
municipalities) and so were the totality of municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants (another 4,000 
municipalities). 
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the Bank of Spain for better locations or leave those proposed empty. Banks would 
finally inform the Bank of Spain of their choices. Rules of preference were established 
for the awarding of offices in case several banks made a bid for the same branch.19  
 
If accepted by the Bank of Spain, banks could then proceed to open the corresponding 
branch. Although plans were drawn up annually, in most cases openings were phased 
over a period of two to three years. Inspection of the actual branch openings suggests 
that banks were, on occasions, able to open branches not included in the plans. This 
might be either because the Bank of Spain agreed to the opening of some branches that 
banks had been lobbying for or because banks were able to bypass the Bank of Spain’s 
decisions. 
 
Table 1 describes the number of branches included in each plan as well as the number of 
branches finally selected by the banks and awarded by the Bank of Spain. The fact that 
the number of branches awarded is systematically smaller than the total number of 
branches in the plans suggests that some of the latter were sited in unattractive 
locations. This is clearly evident in the last two plans. In 1971, the Ministry of Finance 
established “open access” for 80% of the usable “expansion capacity”. Under this new 
Order, the eighth plan was passed in March 1972, with 172 branch offices, of which just 
17 were allocated, whereas 326 were awarded under “open access”. This shows that 
banks preferred to use their expansion capacity to open branches in locations other than 
those listed in the plans.  
 
 [INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
2.3.2. Savings bank plans 
The savings banks’ plans worked very much in the same way as those of their 
commercial counterparts. They were drawn up directly by the Ministry of Finance along 
with the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (CECA). Each plan included a list of 
municipalities selected according to criteria “a, b, c and d” cited above, with 70% of the 
listings responding to criterion “a” and 99% to criteria “a” or “b”. Again, the 
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 Local banks operating in a single province had preference over local banks operating in a banking 
district, which in turn had preference over local banks operating in several banking districts, which had 
preference over regional banks, which had preference over national banks.  
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municipalities subject to criteria “a, b, c and d” were considerably more numerous than 
the number of municipalities typically included in the plans. The Ministry of Finance 
would rely on objective information sources similar to those taken into account by the 
Bank of Spain to decide which municipalities to include in the plans. The plan was then 
shared with the savings banks who would request their preferred branches subject to 
their expansion capacity. Only the first four plans and the adjudications from the fifth 
and sixth plans were found here. The descriptive statistics for these plans are provided 
in Table 2.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Data and variables 
Our dataset is a cross-section of municipalities that draws on several sources. First, the 
outcomes of interest are drawn from the 1970 Census of Establishments and the 1970 
Population Census, both compiled by the INE (Spain’s National Institute of Statistics). 
Second, the main explanatory variable relies on information taken directly from the 
expansion plans, accessed via the Bank of Spain and the Ministry of Finance’s historical 
archives. Third, we draw on the 1950 and 1960 Population Censuses, the 1965-1966 
Banesto Yearbooks and georeferenced data to create a comprehensive set of controls. 
Finally, the 1970 and 1980 Censuses of Establishments and the 1976-1977 Banesto 
Yearbooks are used to track actual branch openings. We define each of these variable 
sets below. 
 
Outcome variables – The outcomes of interest are defined as the number of workers per 
inhabitant and the number of business establishments per inhabitant in 1970 (excluding 
sectors relating to banking so as to avoid including the expansion of the banks’ branch 
networks as an outcome). 
 
Treatment variables – We define a dummy variable with a value of one if the 
municipality is listed in one of the first five plans for commercial banks (the plans 
leading to branch openings by 1970) and a value of zero otherwise. We also create an 
alternative dummy variable for placebo tests with a value of one if the municipality is 
12
listed in one of the last four plans for commercial banks and a value of zero otherwise. 
We define a dummy variable with a value of one if the municipality is listed in one of 
the first four plans for savings banks (the plans leading to branch openings by 1970) and 
a value of zero otherwise.    
 
Control variables – Our set of controls seeks to capture all the factors that the Bank of 
Spain took into account in drawing up the plans. The control variables are measured as 
of 1963 when appropriate to ensure that they are predetermined with respect to the 
plans. We use the following set of variables. A) Municipality size is measured as the 
1960 number of inhabitants. Variations in municipality size are defined as the increase 
in the number of inhabitants between the 1960 and 1950 censuses. B) The pre-plans 
geographic distribution of branches is captured by a dummy variable with a value of 
one if the municipality was within a 10-km radius of the closest branch.20 We also 
control for the number of savings bank branches in the municipality in 1963 (from the 
Banesto Yearbooks). C) The geographical distribution of the industrial promotion and 
development poles included in the Development Plans is captured by two dummy 
variables with a value of one if the municipality is within a 10-km radius of the closest 
industrial promotion and development poles, respectively.21 The information used to 
create this variable is taken from Pujadas and Font (1998). D) The economic importance 
of the municipality is measured using a series of indicators from the Banesto 
Yearbooks: the number of commercial licenses, the number of trucks, the number of 
telephones, the municipal budget and the tax revenue from cultural shows. All these 
variables are defined in per capita terms. E) Tourism intensity is measured using a 
tourism index drawn from the Banesto Yearbooks. F) In order to capture the 
municipalities’ geographical traits we use the following variables: surface, distance to 
the coast, elevation, ruggedness and x-y coordinates. G) The economic outlook of the 
province to which the municipalities belong is captured by a full set of province dummy 
variables. 
 
Branch openings – We define three dummy variables for commercial banks and a 
further three for savings banks capturing whether the municipality recorded a branch 
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 We experimented with other distances as well as with a continuous variable. The results are robust to 
these different definitions.  
21We experimented with other distances as well as with a continuous variable. The results are robust to 
these different definitions.   
13
opening for the first time from the respective banking institution during the 1963-1970, 
1970-1975 and 1975-1980 periods.  
 
3.2. Sample and descriptive statistics 
The sample used in the regressions includes all the municipalities with no commercial 
banks (but, perhaps, with savings banks) by 1963 with non-missing values for the 
outcomes, explanatory variables and controls. This gives us a total of 2,862 
municipalities, which virtually represents the universe of municipalities without a 
commercial bank branch in 1963 and 75% of all municipalities with at least 1,000 
inhabitants.22  
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables described up to this point 
plus those for some additional variables of interest. Actual branch openings were largely 
driven by the plans: 71% of the municipalities in the pre-1970 savings banks’ plans and 
77% of the municipalities both in the pre-1970 savings and commercial banks’ plans 
had received savings bank branch openings by 1970. Similarly, 79% of the 
municipalities in the pre-1970 commercial banks’ plans and 84% of the municipalities 
both in the pre-1970 commercial and savings banks’ plans had received commercial 
bank branch openings by 1970. Some of the municipalities in the post-1970 commercial 
banks’ plans (about 40%) had also received commercial bank branch openings by 1970. 
This is mainly because the sixth plan was circulated by the end of 1969 and could have 
led to some branch openings by 1970. In contrast, the percentage of municipalities 
excluded from the plans but that received branch openings by 1970 is very small (13% 
in the case of commercial banks and 19% in that of savings banks).  
 
The average distance to the closest branch fell by about 10 km for municipalities in the 
plans between 1963 and 1970. Interestingly, the average distance to the closest 
(commercial or savings bank) branch shifted to virtually zero km for all the 
municipalities in the pre- and, even, in the post-1970 commercial or savings banks’ 
plans. This implies that all the municipalities in the plans gained access to the savings 
products described above. In contrast, the average distance to the closest commercial 
bank branch remained considerable for municipalities excluded from the pre-1970 
                                                          
22
 Smaller municipalities are not covered in the Banesto Yearbooks and had little presence in the 
Expansion Plan 
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commercial banks’ plans. This implies that it was mainly the municipalities in the 
commercial banks’ plans that experienced an improvement in their access to 
commercial bank branches and, therefore, to credit. The municipalities not included in 
the plans remained considerably isolated from banking services with an average 
distance to the closest commercial (commercial or savings) bank branch of 8.7 km (5.7 
km). However, it should be noted that municipalities not included in the plans also 
experienced a non-negligible reduction in their distance to the closest branch. This 
could have occurred either because they were sited near to locations included in the 
plans or because they experienced branch openings themselves. Whatever the case, it 
seems that some spillovers resulted from the execution of the plans, thus improving the 
banking services of the control municipalities.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Figure 3 maps the municipalities in the sample (by colour) according to their role in the 
plans. Importantly, there are no differences in the geographical distribution of the 
municipalities across these groups. The plans had a broad geographical scope targeting 
municipalities the length and breadth of the country.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
 
4. Research design 
We seek to determine whether the unbanked municipalities included in the Banking 
Expansion Plans experienced a greater increase in their economic activity than the 
municipalities excluded from the plans. As not all the municipalities included in the 
plans ended up receiving branch openings, our specification offers intent-to-treat (ITT) 
estimates, that is, the effect of the intention to open a branch in a given municipality on 
the economic activity of the municipality. We estimate a regression of the form:  
 
iiiiii XSBpreCBpostCBprey εδβββ ++++= '19633211970 ___  (4) 
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where i  indexes municipalities, 1970iy  denotes the number of workers or establishments 
per inhabitant in 1970, iCBpre_  is a dummy variable with a value of one if the 
municipality was listed in the pre-1970 plans for commercial banks (i.e. one of the first 
five plans leading to branch openings before 1970), iCBpost_  is a dummy variable 
with a value of one if the municipality was listed in the post-1970 plans for commercial 
banks (i.e. one of the last four plans leading to branch openings after 1970), iSBpre_  
is a dummy variable with a value of one if the municipality was listed in the pre-1970 
plans for savings banks (i.e. one of the first four plans leading to branch openings before 
1970), '1963iX  is the set of municipality-specific controls which are predetermined with 
respect to the plans and iε  is an idiosyncratic error term.  
 
The parameters 1β  and 3β  measure the effect of a municipality being listed in the 
commercial and savings banks’ plans, respectively, on the economic activity of the 
municipality. The parameter 1β  captures effects potentially generated through both the 
lending and the savings channels. On the other hand, 3β  captures effects generated 
mainly through the savings channel. Our identification assumption is that the 
conditional expectations ]|_[ '1963iii XCBpreE ε  and ]|_[ '1963iii XSBpreE ε  are both 
zero. The set of municipality-specific controls '1963iX  includes all the observables that 
were used in drawing up the plans. Therefore, conditional on such controls, inclusion or 
otherwise in the plans should be random and our identification assumption should hold. 
In order to check whether this is the case we use the variable iCBpost_  to carry out 
placebo tests. Given that the outcome variables are taken from the 1970 census, they 
should be unaffected by whether the municipality is included or not in the post-1970 
plans. Positive effects of iCBpost_  would strongly suggest that inclusion in the plans 
is correlated with omitted variables that are in turn correlated with the municipalities’ 
economic development. On the other hand, insignificant effects of iCBpost_  would 
suggest that inclusion in the plans is uncorrelated with unobservable variables. We 
therefore interpret 02 =β  as evidence that the identification assumption is met. We 
cannot carry out the same placebo test for savings banks because iSBpost_  is not 
observed. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Main results 
Table 4 shows our main results. For sake of clarity, we focus on the coefficients of our 
main variables of interest. Results are provided for specifications with the dependent 
variable in both levels and logs. If these estimates diverge, we rely on the log values as 
they are less severely affected by outliers.  
 
Panel A reports results obtained with the number of workers per inhabitant as the 
dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of a specification that omits the 
control variables. The pre- and post-1970 plan dummy variables are both strongly 
significant for commercial banks and present a similar magnitude. The fact that the 
post-1970 plan variable is significant indicates that the unconditioned estimates are 
upward biased. The pre-1970 dummy variable is insignificant for savings banks. In 
columns 3 and 4 we condition on the full set of controls. The coefficient on the pre-
1970 commercial banks’ plan dummy variable remains significant, albeit substantially 
smaller than in the specification without controls, and the coefficient on the post-1970 
commercial banks’ plan dummy variable goes to zero. As discussed above, 02 =β  
suggests that the identification condition is met when using the full set of controls. The 
pre-1970 savings banks’ plan dummy variable remains insignificant. Panel B displays 
the results obtained with the number of establishments per capita as the dependent 
variable. The identification condition is again met, but inclusion in the plans had no 
effect on the number of establishments.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
Overall, the results imply that the plans increased economic activity essentially through 
the lending channel but not through the savings channel. The lending channel had an 
effect on the intensive margin (i.e. an increase in the size of establishments) but not on 
the extensive margin (i.e. on the number of establishments). This is not surprising given 
the structure of lending during the Expansion Plans, which resorted heavily to short-
term credit by providing working capital and liquidity in the main. Taking column 4 
estimates as the baseline, inclusion in the plans resulted in a 9% increase in the number 
of workers per inhabitant on average. We interpret this estimate as a lower bound for the 
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real effect of the plans because some of the municipalities not included in the plans also 
recorded branch openings prior to 1970 and also because the plans might have had 
positive externalities on neighbouring controls.  
 
In the subsections that follow, we carry out several robustness checks to test the strength 
of the results. We include the pre-1970 savings bank dummy variable among the set of 
controls, but we do not display its coefficient (which always remains insignificant) for 
reasons of space. We focus instead on the coefficients of the pre-1970 and post-1970 
savings banks’ variables.  
 
5.2. Alternative samples 
In Table 5 we replicate the baseline results for alternative samples. Columns 1 and 2 
show results for municipalities that had commercial bank branches by 1980. In 1975, all 
restrictions on commercial banks as regards where they might open new branches were 
lifted. It might be argued that the municipalities that were not banked in the years 
immediately following liberalization were less appealing locations and so make less 
suitable controls (i.e. municipalities that the Bank of Spain would never have included 
in its plans). To ensure that this is not driving our results, we re-estimate equation (1) on 
the subset of municipalities that had received commercial bank openings by 1980. The 
point estimate is slightly smaller but still significant.   
 
In columns 3 and 4 we focus on municipalities that had neither commercial nor savings 
banks when the plans were first introduced outset. As explained above, compulsory 
investment coefficients were imposed on the savings banks, which seriously constrained 
their lending activity. However, they could still use up to 20% of their deposits for 
ordinary lending. Therefore, municipalities without savings banks were likely to be 
more financially constrained and to benefit relatively more from branch openings. The 
estimated coefficient is higher suggesting that this was indeed the case.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
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5.3. Plan-specific dummy variables 
Table 6 replicates the baseline regressions using the full set of plan dummies as opposed 
to the pre-/post-1970 dummy variables. In the workers’ regressions all the plan dummy 
variables are positive and significant in the specification without controls in columns 1 
and 2. When adding the controls in columns 3 and 4 only the first four plans remain 
significant. This is the case no matter whether we define the dependent variable in 
levels or in logs. In the establishment regressions, the first six plan dummies are 
significant in the unconditional regressions with inclusion of the controls resulting in 
only the first plan remaining significant. The plan dummy regressions reinforce the 
perception that the identification condition is met. None of the plans resulting in 
openings after 1970 enters the regressions with a positive sign. Even the fifth plan, 
which was published in late 1968, has no effect on the number of establishments. This 
makes sense because, as explained above, branch openings were phased in over a period 
of two to three years, meaning that some of the branches granted in the fifth plan did not 
become operative until after the 1970 census.  
 
The finding that the fifth and sixth plans (the last two published prior to the 1970 
census) have no significant effects is also consistent with relationship lending (Berger 
and Udell, 1995). It takes some time for commercial banks to solve asymmetric 
information problems associated with small borrowers by producing and analysing 
information and by establishing loan contract terms. That relationship lending might 
have played an important role in determining the speed at which the plans took effect is 
also suggested by the results of the extensive margin regressions where only the first 
plan dummy is significant. Loans aimed at financing the creation of new businesses 
might require a larger amount of information about borrowers than loans for expanding 
existing businesses, which tend to be lower risk and easier to handle.   
 
 [INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
5.4. Results by sectors 
Four sectors of activity are present in almost all the municipalities in the sample, 
namely manufacturing, services, retail and wholesale (henceforth, we refer to the last 
three as non-manufacturing sectors). It is our contention that the manufacturing sector 
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would have benefited relatively less from the expansion plans because it could have 
adjusted ex ante to adverse lending shocks. Manufacturing firms’ ability to dissociate 
production and sales should have allowed them to relocate production to banked 
municipalities long before the plans were introduced. Non-manufacturing firms, which 
can only serve demand on the spot, would not have been able to tap on other 
municipalities’ branches (not if distance mattered) to seize demand opportunities in 
their municipality. Table 7 shows separate results by sector. The positive effect of the 
plans is particularly robust for services and retail where we find not only intensive but 
also extensive margin effects. Intensive margin effects are also present in the wholesale 
sector. However, no effects are found in the manufacturing sector.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
5.5. Real openings 
Table 8 shows the results obtained with actual branch openings as opposed to the 
branches listed in the plans. Inclusion in the plans was based on determinants captured 
by the set of controls. In contrast, final branching decisions were in part the result of the 
plans, but also of cherry picking among the best locations offered by the plans and of 
lobbying. The latter openings are unobservable and hard to control for. As such, we 
would expect regressions based on actual openings to be affected by an omitted variable 
bias. We replace the pre- and post-1970 plan dummies with three dummy variables 
indicating whether the municipality received a branch opening between 1963 and 1970, 
between 1970 and 1975 or between 1975 and 1980. Since the outcome variables are all 
from the 1970 census, we only expect the first dummy variable to enter the regressions 
with a positive sign.  
 
The coefficient on the 1963-1970 branch opening dummy variable is indeed positive for 
commercial banks. It is also significant and substantially larger than in the regressions 
based on plan listings as opposed to actual openings (being particularly larger in the log 
specifications). However, the 1970-1975 (i.e. post-1970 plan period) and 1975-1980 
(i.e. post-liberalization period) dummy variables are also significant both in the 
specification with and without controls for commercial banks. This strongly suggests 
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that actual openings are correlated with omitted variables and cannot be used to obtain 
well-identified estimates. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the importance of lifting the barriers that prevent the 
supply of financial products reaching unbanked municipalities with a high demand for 
traditional banking services. We adopt a quasi-experimental approach to our study of a 
specific program, the Banking Expansion Plan, which put an end to two decades of 
banking status quo in Spain, during which demand for financial services had built up in 
unserved municipalities. Our identification strategy has relied on the fact that, 
conditional on certain objective and observable criteria, inclusion in the plans was as 
good as random. We find that unleashing supply was beneficial to these unbanked 
municipalities. On average, inclusion in the pre-1970 plans resulted in a 9% increase in 
the 1970 number of workers per inhabitant. A break down by sector reveals that 
extensive margin effects were also present in the services and retail sectors, which were 
likely to be more credit constrained due to their inability to dissociate production and 
sales. In contrast, no effects were found for the manufacturing sector which could have 
adjusted ex ante to the shortage of local banking services. 
  
The estimated effect is entirely driven by the lending channel, as indicated by the fact 
that inclusion in the commercial banks’ plans mattered whereas inclusion in the savings 
banks’ plans did not. By and large, the most common form of lending in that period was 
the discounting of trade bills, which essentially provided working capital and liquidity. 
Our results suggest that this form of lending is important for economic activity. Longer 
term collateralized loans suitable for capital investments were also common but less 
frequent during the period under analysis. That some of the documented effect was 
caused by an increase in local demand triggered by consumption loans cannot be ruled 
out.  
 
The finding that the savings banks’ plans had no effect on economic activity does not 
necessarily mean that the savings channel does not matter for economic activity. It only 
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means that it does not matter in our specific context with a relatively short six-year lag 
between the recording of the outcomes in the 1970 census and the publication of the 
first plan in 1964. This lag is, of course, even shorter for later plans. It might just take 
longer than that for the savings channel to generate significant effects. Individuals must 
first save a reasonable amount of money before being able to make significant 
investments in indivisible assets.  
 
Our paper is a reminder that failure to extend financial products to the poor is neither 
the only cause of financial exclusion nor the only financial remedy for development. A 
second form of financial exclusion, and one that is potentially detrimental to economic 
development, can also arise in emerging countries with rampant demand for standard 
banking services if supply cannot keep pace.  
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Figure 1. Financial development over time  
 
Sources: The first graph is based on the 1965 and 1966 Banesto Yearbooks (providing information for the 
year 1964), and the 1970 and 1980 Censuses of Establishments. Values for years prior to 1964 have been 
set equal to the values in 1964 (the first year offering detailed municipality level information). Values for 
the years between 1964-1970 and 1970-1980 have been calculated by interpolation. The second graph is 
based on information from the Anuario Estadístico de la Banca Privada (AEBanca) and the Anuario 
Estadístico de las Cajas de Ahorros Confederadas (CECA).  
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Figure 2. Unfolding of a Plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Bank of Spain (or the Ministry of Finance) draws up a 
preliminary plan with the municipalities eligible for branch 
openings and the number of branches to be opened in each 
municipality.  
1 
The preliminary plan is circulated to the banks which then 
suggest the addition or removal of certain municipalities from the 
plan. A final plan is drawn up taking these suggestions into 
account.   
2 
Banks bid for the municipalities included in the final plan and 
also lobby for locations off the final plan. The Bank of Spain (or 
the Ministry of Finance) accepts or declines such requests. 
. The Bank of Spain   
3 
Banks proceed with the branch openings. 
 
4 
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Figure 3. Geographical distribution of municipalities by group 
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Pre-1970, CB
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Commercial banks’ plans 
 
Plan Approval date 
Branches listed in 
the plan 
Branches 
awarded 
Branches 
awarded under 
open access 
1st 1964, October  210 179 na 
2nd 1965, October 399 307 na 
3rd 1967, January 218 197 na 
4th 1967, December  221 190 na 
5th 1968, October  220 210 na 
6th 1969, October  224 202 na 
7th 1970, October  151 144 na 
8th 1972, March  172 17 326 
9th 1973, February 154 116 387 
Source: Martín-Aceña (2012). Our information from the original plans yields similar figures for the 
column “Branches listed in the plans”. However, we are unable to observe the final adjudications (last 
two columns). 
 
Table 2. Savings banks’ plans 
 
Plan Approval date Branches listed in the plan 
Branches 
awarded 
1st 1964 346 na 
2nd 1965 639 na 
3rd 1966 423 na 
4th 1968 400 na 
5th 1969 na 151 
6th 1970 na 157 
7th 1971 na na 
Source: Based on information in the plans. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Off plans Pre-1970, SB Pre-1970, CB & SB Pre-1970, CB Post-1970, CB 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Outcomes           
Workers 1970/inhabitants 1970 0.083 (0.087) 0.092 (0.088) 0.121 (0.100) 0.130 (0.102) 0.124 (0.103) 
Establishments 1970/inhabitants 1970 0.037 (0.016) 0.037 (0.015) 0.038 (0.020) 0.041 (0.021) 0.038 (0.016) 
Explanatory variables           
pre-1970 commercial bank plans (0,1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 
post-1970 commercial bank plans (0,1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 
pre-1970 savings bank plans (0,1) 0 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0.4 (0.5) 
Branch opening dummy variable           
1963-1970, commercial bank (0,1) 0.13 (0.33) 0.20 (0.40) 0.84 (0.37) 0.79 (0.41) 0.40 (0.49) 
1970-1975, commercial bank (0,1) 0.51 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) 0.07 (0.26) 0.12 (0.33) 0.39 (0.49) 
1975-1980, commercial bank (0,1) 0.10 (0.30) 0.16 (0.37) 0.04 (0.21) 0.03 (0.18) 0.09 (0.29) 
1963-1970, savings bank (0,1) 0.19 (0.39) 0.71 (0.45) 0.77 (0.42) 0.26 (0.44) 0.48 (0.50) 
1970-1975, savings bank (0,1) 0.40 (0.49) 0.15 (0.36) 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.21) 0.11 (0.32) 
1975-1980, savings bank (0,1) 0.06 (0.24) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.14) 
Distance to closest branch (in  km) 
Distance to closest commercial bank branch in 1963 12.7 (7.3) 12.4 (7.2) 13.8 (16.5) 11.3 (6.8) 12.0 (15.6) 
Distance to closest commercial bank branch in 1970 8.7 (5.7) 8.0 (6.3) 1.7 (5.0) 2.2 (5.1) 4.6 (5.0) 
Distance to closest branch in 1963 10.6 (5.7) 9.9 (5.3) 12.8 (15.1) 10.4 (5.0) 11.6 (17.5) 
Distance to closest branch in 1970 5.7 (4.8) 1.5 (3.5) 0.2 (1.5) 0.3 (1.4) 1.1 (2.8) 
Number of observations 1,596 628 179 302 157 
 
Note: The descriptive statistics are split into five samples based on whether the municipality is off the plans (i.e. excluded), in the pre-1970 savings bank plans, in the pre-
1970 savings and commercial bank plans, in the pre-1970 commercial bank plans or in the post-1970 commercial bank plans. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics (continuation) 
 
 
 
Off plans Pre-1970, SB Pre-1970, CB & SB Pre-1970, CB Post-1970, CB 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Control variables           
Number of savings banks 1963 0.274 (0.509) 0.172 (0.633) 0.196 (0.637) 0.725 (0.547) 0.389 (0.527) 
10 km distance from closest branch in 1963 (0,1) 0.398 (0.490) 0.532 (0.499) 0.436 (0.497) 0.172 (0.378) 0.408 (0.493) 
10 km distance from closest development pole (0,1) 0.010 (0.100) 0.016 (0.125) 0.011 (0.105) 0.010 (0.099) 0.013 (0.113) 
10 km distance from closest development zone (0,1) 0.026 (0.160) 0.045 (0.207) 0.084 (0.278) 0.036 (0.188) 0.070 (0.256) 
Inhabitants 1960 2,033 (1,198) 2,476 (1,482) 6,046 (4,184) 5,163 (2,957) 4,226 (5,297) 
Inhabitants 1960 minus inhabitants 1950 
-87 (667) -27 (432) 634 (1,368) 337 (1,057) 247 (1,125) 
Telephones 1963/inhabitants 1960 0.016 (0.029) 0.019 (0.035) 0.042 (0.080) 0.038 (0.084) 0.029 (0.031) 
Trucks 1963/inhabitants 1960 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.004) 
Commercial licenses 1963/inhabitants 1960 0.012 (0.008) 0.012 (0.006) 0.014 (0.008) 0.015 (0.010) 0.015 (0.008) 
Budget 1963/inhabitants 1960 293 (238) 293 (230) 308 (278) 331 (377) 277 (154) 
Tourism index 1963 0.34 (11.00) 0.48 (10.01) 21.65 (125.06) 6.32 (46.77) 3.47 (22.89) 
Squared kilometres 67 (60) 74 (75) 94 (86) 99 (106) 69 (72) 
Distance to coast (in km) 113 (93) 112 (100) 86 (110) 68 (76) 75 (101) 
Elevation (mean) 632 (335) 576 (344) 456 (344) 405 (317) 454 (336) 
Ruggedness (mean) 70 (56) 67 (51) 66 (48) 60 (45) 71 (55) 
x centroid coordinate 441,335 (227,416)  435,665 (268,552) 372,432 (305,908) 467,718 (303,338) 502,382 (325,934) 
y centroid coordinate 4,464,653 (231,053) 4,482,932 (209,200) 4,517,976 (262,597) 4,422,617 (250,244) 4,424,846 (248,900) 
Number of observations 1,596 628 179 302 157 
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Table 4. Main results 
  
 
 Levels ln Levels ln 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 A. Dependent variable: workers per inhabitant 
     
Pre-1970, commercial banks 0.041*** 0.380*** 0.018*** 0.093*** 
 (0.005) (0.037) (0.004) (0.035) 
Post-1970, commercial banks 0.037*** 0.332*** 0.007 0.022 
 (0.008) (0.066) (0.007) (0.056) 
Pre-1970, savings banks 0.004 0.031 0.006* 0.035 
 (0.004) (0.030) (0.003) (0.025) 
     
Control mean 0.086 -2.724 0.086 -2.724 
Control SD (0.088) (0.701) (0.088) (0.701) 
R-squared 0.033 0.045 0.395 0.476 
     
 B. Dependent variable: establishments per 
inhabitant 
     
Pre-1970, commercial banks 0.004*** 0.070*** 0.002 0.022 
 (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.025) 
Post-1970, commercial banks 0.001 0.008 -0.001 -0.026 
 (0.001) (0.042) (0.001) (0.038) 
Pre-1970, savings banks -0.001 -0.029 -0.000 -0.012 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.017) 
     
Control mean 0.037 -3.378 0.037 -3.378 
Control SD (0.016) (0.443) (0.016) (0.443) 
R-squared 0.006 0.003 0.408 0.356 
     
Full set of control variables No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Panel A is the number of workers over the number of 
inhabitants in 1970. The dependent variable in Panel B is the number of establishments over the number of 
inhabitants in 1970. The control mean is calculated over all municipalities excluded from the pre-1970 
commercial bank plans. 
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Table 5. Alternative samples 
 
Sample Commercial bank branch by 1980 
No savings bank 
branch in 1960 
 Levels ln Levels ln 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 A. Dependent variable: workers per inhabitant 
     
Pre-1970, commercial banks 0.014*** 0.069* 0.025*** 0.112** 
 (0.005) (0.041) (0.006) (0.048) 
Post-1970, commercial banks 0.006 0.033 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.057) (0.009) (0.075) 
     
Control mean 0.113 -2.459 0.085 -2.748 
Control SD (0.110) (0.723) (0.089) (0.719) 
R-squared 0.413 0.532 0.374 0.461 
     
 B. Dependent variable: establishments per 
inhabitant 
     
Pre-1970, commercial banks 0.001 0.005 0.003** 0.033 
 (0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.035) 
Post-1970, commercial banks -0.001 -0.014 -0.001 -0.034 
 (0.001) (0.035) (0.002) (0.050) 
     
Control mean 0.041 -3.272 0.036 -3.390 
Control SD (0.016) (0.409) (0.016) (0.453) 
R-squared 0.497 0.405 0.372 0.337 
     
Full set of control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,328 1,328 2,100 2,100 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Panel A is the number of workers over the number of 
inhabitants in 1970. The dependent variable in Panel B is the number of establishments over the number of 
inhabitants in 1970. Columns 1-2 report estimates for the subsample of municipalities with a commercial bank 
branch by 1980. Columns 3-4 report estimates for the sample of municipalities that had neither commercial nor 
savings banks in 1963. The control mean is calculated over all municipalities excluded from the pre-1970 
commercial bank plans. 
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Table 6. Plan dummy variables 
  
Dependent variable: Workers per inhabitant Establishments per inhabitant 
 Levels ln Levels ln Levels ln Levels ln 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Plan 1 0.039*** 0.367*** 0.019** 0.089* 0.004** 0.087** 0.004** 0.072** 
 (0.010) (0.066) (0.008) (0.052) (0.002) (0.038) (0.001) (0.034) 
Plan 2 0.023*** 0.274*** 0.010** 0.041 0.004*** 0.087** 0.002 0.026 
 (0.006) (0.054) (0.005) (0.046) (0.002) (0.036) (0.001) (0.032) 
Plan 3 0.079*** 0.706*** 0.024** 0.180*** 0.008*** 0.174*** 0.001 0.032 
 (0.013) (0.086) (0.011) (0.068) (0.003) (0.055) (0.002) (0.046) 
Plan 4 0.053*** 0.411*** 0.024** 0.145** 0.002 0.025 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.014) (0.096) (0.010) (0.064) (0.002) (0.053) (0.002) (0.045) 
Plan 5 0.043** 0.320** 0.017 0.088 -0.005** -0.171** -0.002 -0.073 
 (0.017) (0.141) (0.012) (0.084) (0.002) (0.076) (0.002) (0.063) 
Plan 6 0.031* 0.332*** 0.011 0.096 0.006* 0.115 0.004 0.074 
 (0.016) (0.105) (0.017) (0.103) (0.003) (0.079) (0.003) (0.067) 
Plan 7 0.021 0.277* -0.014 -0.057 -0.003 -0.062 -0.002 -0.043 
 (0.019) (0.152) (0.023) (0.176) (0.002) (0.072) (0.004) (0.107) 
Plan 8 0.043*** 0.250* 0.012 -0.033 -0.001 -0.085 -0.002 -0.087 
 (0.016) (0.135) (0.012) (0.104) (0.002) (0.085) (0.002) (0.075) 
Plan 9 0.045*** 0.475*** 0.005 0.064 0.001 0.047 -0.002 -0.024 
 (0.013) (0.105) (0.011) (0.082) (0.002) (0.059) (0.002) (0.058) 
         
Full set of control variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 
R-squared 0.040 0.052 0.396 0.478 0.014 0.011 0.411 0.358 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns 1-4 
is the number of workers over the number of inhabitants in 1970. The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the number of establishments over the number of inhabitants in 
1970. The explanatory variables for which the coefficients are reported included a full set of plan dummy variables with a value of one if the municipality was included in the 
corresponding plan. The pre-1970 dummy variable for inclusion in the savings banks plans (Pre-1970, SB) is included among the set of controls. 
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Table 7. Results by sector 
 
 Services Retail Wholesale Manufacturing 
 Levels ln Levels ln Levels ln Levels ln 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 A. Dependent variable: workers per inhabitant 
         
Pre-1970, commercial banks 0.0035** 0.1212*** 0.0029*** 0.0838*** 0.0012 0.1185** 0.0094** 0.0676 
 (0.0017) (0.0370) (0.0006) (0.0304) (0.0009) (0.0600) (0.0039) (0.0570) 
Post-1970, commercial banks -0.0005 -0.0312 0.0006 0.0200 0.0016 0.0828 0.0047 0.0661 
 (0.0019) (0.0541) (0.0007) (0.0434) (0.0015) (0.0841) (0.0055) (0.0763) 
         
Control mean 0.025 -3.905 0.015 -4.349 0.006 -5.590 0.039 -4.005 
Control SD 0.027 0.599 0.010 0.587 0.014 0.959 0.072 1.176 
R-squared 0.2604 0.2447 0.3526 0.3747 0.2045 0.3221 0.3215 0.4713 
         
 B. Dependent variable: establishments per inhabitant 
         
Pre-1970, commercial banks -0.0002 0.0560** 0.0014*** 0.0502* 0.0002 0.0429 0.0002 -0.0248 
 (0.0004) (0.0261) (0.0003) (0.0274) (0.0002) (0.0452) (0.0002) (0.0323) 
Post-1970, commercial banks -0.0007* -0.0371 0.0008* 0.0122 0.0002 -0.0051 -0.0001 -0.0271 
 (0.0004) (0.0387) (0.0004) (0.0410) (0.0002) (0.0617) (0.0003) (0.0461) 
         
Control mean 0.013 -4.420 0.011 -4.607 0.003 -5.941 0.007 -5.037 
Control SD 0.007 0.449 0.005 0.449 0.003 0.750 0.005 0.650 
R-squared 0.3868 0.3319 0.4320 0.3863 0.2278 0.3556 0.3308 0.4038 
         
         
Full set of control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,852 2,852 2,819 2,819 2,284 2,284 2,801 2,801 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns 1-4 
is the number of workers over the number of inhabitants in 1970. The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the number of establishments over the number of inhabitants in 
1970. The explanatory variables for which the coefficients are reported include a dummy variables with a value of one if the municipality received a branch opening for the 
first time during the indicated period. These dummy variables are defined for commercial banks (CB) and savings banks (SB). 
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Table 8. Real openings 
         
Dependent variable: Workers per inhabitant Establishments per inhabitant 
 Levels ln Levels  ln Levels ln Levels ln 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Between 1963 and 1970, CB 0.044*** 0.483*** 0.015*** 0.162*** 0.010*** 0.266*** 0.005*** 0.155*** 
 (0.005) (0.038) (0.004) (0.035) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.023) 
Between 1970 and 1975, CB 0.013*** 0.193*** 0.004 0.088*** 0.006*** 0.175*** 0.003*** 0.089*** 
 (0.005) (0.038) (0.004) (0.031) (0.001) (0.025) (0.001) (0.022) 
Between 1975 and 1980, CB 0.022*** 0.236*** 0.007 0.088** 0.004*** 0.132*** 0.001 0.054** 
 (0.008) (0.052) (0.007) (0.042) (0.001) (0.030) (0.001) (0.026) 
         
Between 1963 and 1970, SB 0.011** 0.079** 0.007 0.081** 0.001* 0.048*** 0.002* 0.064** 
 (0.004) (0.031) (0.005) (0.038) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.025) 
Between 1970 and 1975, SB -0.014*** -0.209*** -0.006 -0.051 -0.002* -0.071*** -0.001 -0.042 
 (0.005) (0.038) (0.005) (0.044) (0.001) (0.026) (0.001) (0.031) 
Between 1975 and 1980, SB -0.000 0.040 -0.005 0.024 -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.021 
 (0.007) (0.067) (0.007) (0.065) (0.001) (0.040) (0.001) (0.041) 
         
Full set of control variables  No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 
R-squared 0.049 0.090 0.397 0.483 0.052 0.056 0.421 0.372 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns 1-4 
is the number of workers over the number of inhabitants in 1970. The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the number of establishments over the number of inhabitants in 
1970. The explanatory variables for which the coefficients are reported include a dummy variables with a value of one if the municipality received a branch opening for the 
first time during the indicated period. These dummy variables are defined for commercial banks (CB) and savings banks (SB). 
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